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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the extent to which donors' multilateral aid is
affected by conditions in their own economics. For this purpose, we use
multiple regression techniques consisting of a pooling of cross-section and
time-series observations on a sample of eight major DAC members (United
States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark) over a 15-year period (1968 to 1982).
Despite the highly speculative nature of such an analysis - the volume
of aid is ultimately a political decision - the results seem to indicate
that economic factors, such as the growth of GNP, the budget surplus or the
balance of payments position might influence the volume of multilateral
aid. Furthermore, a comparison of the multilateral and bilateral aid
outlays seems to suggest that they are differently influenced by economic
factors.
However, these results are only statistically significant when the
volume of aid is expressed in absolute terms (nominal or real terms). When
it is expressed as a proportion of GNP, only the GNP per capita is
significant as a predictor.
RESUME
Cette etude a pour objet de preciser a quelle mesure les conditions dans
leur propre economie influence le volume de l'aide multilatdrale dispens6
par les principaux pays membres du CAD. A cette fin, nous proc6dons a une
combinaison de coupe instantande et de series temporelles sur un 6chantillon
de huit pays membres du CAD (Etats-Unis, Allemagne, Royaume-Uni, France,
Pays-Bas, Suede, Norvege, Danemark) pour une p6riode de 15 ann6es
(1968-1982).
En depit du caractere speculatif d'une telle analyse - dans la mesure ou
le volume de l'aide publique procede en dernier lieu d'une d6cision
politique - les resultats paraissent neanmoins confirmer une certaine
influence d'indicateurs tels que la croissance du PNB, le solde budg6taire
ou de la balance des paiements, sur le volume de l'aide multilatdrale. Une
iii
comparaison de 1'allocation d'aide multilaterale et bilaterale semble, par
ailleurs, indiquer que les contraintes economiques influencent differemment
ces deux categories d'apports.
I1 convient de souligner que ces differents resultats ne sont
statistiquement significatifs que lorsque l'aide est exprimee en terme
absolu (nominal ou reel). Lorsque P effort d'aide est exprime en
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After the rapid increases during the early 1970's, multilateral
contributions from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries
declined. The average annual growth of DAC's multilateral assistance has
decreased, in nominal terms, from 27.2% during the period 1970/71 - 1977/78
to 6.5% during the years 1977/78 - 1982/83.1 The stagnation in United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) funding and the difficulties concerning
the replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA) provide
evidence for the reduced priority now given by major donors to multilateral
aid allocation.
It is generally assumed that persistent economic recessions in donor
countries explain this trend. No study, however, has attempted to identify
the real influence of macroeconomic factors on multilateral aid allocation.
Our purpose is to measure this relationship, using multiple-regression
techniques on a sample consisting of the major donor countries.
2. MULTILATERAL AID ALLOCATION MODELS
As pointed out by M. Beenstock, 2 development aid can be considered as
a positive argument in the objective function of governments. Each of them
tends to maximize a certain set of objectives which can be promoted by aid
policies and which reflect a range of economic, cultural, ideologic and
humanitarian considerations. The relative importance of these vary largely
from one country to another and determine the amount of aid they allocate
through multilateral channels. Thus, in the extreme, multilateral
assistance has a strong position in the Scandinavian countries where many
influential people believe that multilateral channels are more neutral and
1Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
Development Cooperation, 1984 review, p. 96.
2M. Beenstock, "Political Econometry of Official Development
Assistance", World Development, Vol. 8 (1980), pp, 137-144. According to
this author, the objective function of donor governments can be expressed as
follows: G = G(ODA(+), BAL(+), POL(-), ... ) where ODA is the amount of aid,
BAL is the balance of payments pressures and POL is a measure of the
political rancor that ODA might generate. Signs in parentheses indicate the
partial derivatives for the respective variables.
1
2
less objectionable from the point of view of the developing countries. 3
On the other hand, some countries such as France, because of its colonial
history, or the United States, for economic and strategic reasons, prefer
bilateral relations with Third World countries.
Since the level of multilateral aid for each donor country is mainly
determined by political factors (relatively constant over time) as mentioned
above, its variations over time seem strongly influenced by economic
considerations. 4 These affect directly the capacity of donor countries
and the political climate towards development aid: pressures from public
opinion and organized interest groups against giving aid are exacerbated
with the worsening of the economic situation in these countries. Our
purpose is to measure the influence of these economic constraints on the
multilateral aid allocation process.
2.1. Aid Variables
To measure the aid performance of donor countries we use Official
Development Assistance (ODA) as defined by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 5  This is primarily because an
important share of multilateral aid channeled through international
3R. Cassen, a _., Rich Country Interests and Third World Development
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 298.
4Factors other than economic ones can influence the evolution of
multilateral aid allocation, such as international political pressure.
Therefore, we should take into account the influence of the 0.7% target
fixed by UNCTAD IV in 1976. However, the trend in multilateral aid since
1977-78 clearly indicates that this recommendation had no influence on the
volume of multilateral aid. Shifts in multilateral aid policy in DAC
countries can also influence the multilateral aid allocation process.
Nevertheless, with the exception of the United States at the end of the
period we are considering, there were no major explicit shifts in DAC
countries' multilateral aid policies.
5Thi s concept refers to "grants or loans undertaken by the offi cial
sector, with promotion of economic development and welfare as main
objectives, at concessional financial terms (if a loan, at least 257. grant
element)": OECD, Development Cooperation, annual review. The main
criticism of this concept is that it is calculated according to an arbitrary
interest rate equal to 10% which tends to underestimate the true level of
ODA when interest rates are rising (See M. Beenstock, op. cit.).
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organizations is ODA. Another reason is that the political focus of
governments' attention is usually expressed in terms of trends in ODA.
Multilateral ODA is expressed
* in nominal terms: in most public statements aid is
conventionally measured in current dollars. 6 However, to take
into account the effects of inflation in donor countries, we
also express multilateral ODA in real terms;
" as a percentage of Gross National Product since this indicator
is the most familiar representation of the aid effort. 7
2.2. Independent Variables
To express economic constraints on the donor countries' aid decision, we
use the following indicators:
* Unemployment rate (U), since this indicator reflects the extent
to which an economy is in recession. He can expect that public
opinion puts pressures on governments to focus on domestic
problems instead of foreign aid when domestic unemployment is
high.
* Gross National Product (GNP) which represents an important
constraint on donor countries' ability to give aid. He use also
the GNP per capita, assuming that. the higher a country's GNP per
capita is, the greater the amount of aid is.
" Balance of payments constraint (BAL): He assume that the
stronger the balance of payments position is, the lower the
constraint on aid allocation is. To express the balance of
payments constraint, we use the current account surplus.
* Budget position surplus (BUDG): Even if aid constitutes a very
small part of the national budget, we can expect nevertheless
that the budget's position influences the policy makers'
interest in aid. He hypothesize that governments cut back on
the volume of foreign aid if the domestic budget is in deficit.
60ECD, Development Cooperation, 1975 review, p. 100.
7Since the Pearson Commission has recommended that Northern
States transfer 0.7% of their respective GNPs, most governments refer
to this target. L.P. Pearson, Partners in Development, Report of the
Commission on International Development (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1969).
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These variables are expressed with a one year time-lag, based on the
supposition that aid disbursements in the year t are influenced by
constraints in the year t-l. He assume linear relationships between the
independent variable and the explanatory variables. The sources and symbols
of the data are reported in Section 4 of the Appendix.
According to this view, the multilateral aid allocation process can be
expressed as follows:
ODAm = f(-Utl ;+BUDGi 1; +BALl ;+GNP 1 G'+Ph)
where signs indicate the expected signs on the partial derivatives for the
explanatory variables; and ODAmt represents the amount of multilateral aid
in the country i at the year t.
2.3. Alternative Models
According to this scheme, we propose to estimate the following
regression equations:
[1] ODAmt = +2 tBAL +tBUDGI~+4 GNPt+l
m. 1 l S2 BAI 53 BD 1  4 1
This first equation states that nominal flows of multilateral ODA are
positively influenced by nominal value of the balance of payments surplus,
the budget surplus and the GNP. We do not take the unemployment rate into
account because it is a relative variable.
[2] ODAm t - + 2 BAL t 1 +3 a BUDG 4GNPt + s
In this second equation, variables are expressed in real terms
(indicated by the asterisk). Each of them is deflated by the OECD GNP
deflator at 1982 prices. 8 This is to eliminate the inflation effects.
ODAmt t-1 BALt-1 BUDGtl GNPt-1
[] GNP. "l 01+6 U1  + 63GNP. + 54 GNP. + 65  P. + e
8From QECO, Development Cooperation, 1984 review, p. 263. This
deflator includes the effects of exchange rate changes.
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This equation states that the share of multilateral ODA in proportion to
the donors' GNP is influenced negatively by the rate of unemployment and
positively by the current account balance position, the budget surplus, and
the GNP per capita. This last variable is expressed at constant prices.
These equations are estimated for a sample of eight major donor
countries: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. 9
The observation period is 1968-1982 (15 years) and has been mainly
determined by the availability of statistics. We have decided to pool the
cross-section and time-series data 10 because the time-series are too short
to leave sufficient degrees of freedom for hypothesis testing on each
individual country. This method generates N x T observations in the
time-series.
3. THE REGRESSION RESULTS
These are different models designed to deal with cross-section and
time-series data.11 In this case we use a covariance model assuming that
the intercepts are different for each cross-section but constant over time.
This is primarily to take into account country differences in the amount of
multilateral aid which are not captured by the explanatory variables: i.e.,
the degrees of economic, humanitarian or ideological interests vary among
the different donor countries and influence the amount of ODA channeled
through international organizations. We assume that these factors do not
vary significantly over time.
Under these assumptions, the regression equations then become:
9We do not take Japan into account, although it is a major donor
country, because statistical data are lacking.
10The pooled data method is used by Beenstock, lo. GIt. p. 141.
II5ee 3. Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics (New York: Macmillan,
1971), pp. 508-517, as an example.
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n K
YIt =ai+ E Y. Dit + K XkiIt +Et
i=2 1k=1 1
where Dit - 1 for the ith cross-sectional unit
= 0 otherwise (i = 2,...... n)
He use N - 1 dummy variables because if we include both the constant
term and N dummy variables, we will be introducing perfect
multi-collinearity and the regression program will not run.
These models are treated within the framework of the classical
regression model assuming that the stochastic disturbances have constant
variance and are independently distributed over time and individuals. These
assumptions can be expressed as follows:
E(E2t = 2 (homoskedasticity)
~it)Y
E(Eit jt) = 0 (i#j) (cross-sectional independence)
E(E t s) - 0 (t> s) (non autoregression)
In each case studied, we estimate a restricted and unrestricted model
(Table 1) to test whether the intercepts are different, using an F-statistic
test as described in Section 1 of the Appendix. The hypothesis of different
intercepts for the cross-section units is confirmed in each case.
However, we are confronted with a problem of serial correlation as the
insignificant D-H statistic values show. A general source of serial
correlation is that some variables which should have been included in the
equation are omitted, and that these omitted variables are themselves
autocorrelated. 12  Hence, we attempted to remove serial correlation by
assuming a first-order autoregressive scheme:
it -p"i i,t-1 + uit
12See 3. Johnston, Econometric Methods, Third edition, (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1984), pp. 309-310.
TABLE 1
MULTILATERAL AID PROCESS: RESULTS OF FIRST REGRESSION ANALYSIS
(with serial correlation)
Estimation Dependent GNP* BAL DJDG
Equation Method Variable BAL BUDG GNP BAL* BUDG* GNP* U P GNP GNP Constant SSE Sp R2  D-M F
1 0.L.S. ODAm 0.009* -0.006* 0.0007** -- - - - - -- -- 0.11** 6.99 0.25 0.77 2.13" 137.1"
(1.84) (1.90) ( 8.36) (4.22)
2 OLS with ODAm 0.012** -0.0017 0.0012** -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.78** 4.70 0.20 0.83 2.73 62.7"
dummy (2.68) (0.60) (10.99) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (5.85)
variables
3 OLS ODAm' - - - 0.006 -0.008** 0.0005** -- -- -- -- 0.20** 8.75 0.29 0.78 2.50 127.0"
(1.33) (3.47) (8.42) (5.66)
4 OLS with ODAm* -- -- -- 0.007 -0.006** 0.001** -- -- -- -- -2.21** 6.83 0.27 0.82 2.97 48.0"
dummy (1.60) (2.73) (5.74) (3.64)
variables
5 OLS ODA -- -- - -- - -- -0.0001' 0.0003** -0.0001** -0.007 -0.0009 9.10~4 0.92 0.36 0.58 17.7"
_NP_(1.89) (5.01) (3.27) (1.59) (1.69)
6 OLS with ODAm -- - - -- -- 0.00004 0.0003** -0.003 -0.001 -0.003** 2.10~4 0.5 0.81 1.30 474*
dummy GNP (1.42) (7.10) (1.19) (0.42) (7.11)
variables
NOTES: The figures in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-values.
R2is the corrected coefficient of determination.
SSE is the error sum of squares.
Sy is the standard error of the estimate.
F indicates the F-value.
D-N is the Durbin-Hatson statistic value.
OLS indicates ordinary least squares.
Asterisks mean that the variable is expressed in real terms.
** t Significant at the 1% level.
* significant at the 5L level.
TABLE 2
MULTILATERAL AID PROCESS: RESULTS OF SECOND REGRESSION A ALYSIS
(serial correlation removed)
Number
Number of of Dependent GNP' AL BDG
Equation Countries Period Observations Variable U BAL SUDG GNP BAL' BUDG' GNP' P GNP GNP U.GNP Constant SSE Sy R
2  
D-W F
7 8 68-82 120 ODAm 0.0083** -0.008" 0.0010" ---- --- - - - - - -0.65" 3.82 0.18 0.86 1.79" 79"
(2.57) (3.57) (12.58) (7.38)
8 8 68-82 f20 ODAm 0.010** -0.010" 0.0012"* - - - - - - - 0.00003 -0.72" 3.78 0.18 0.86 1.71* 72"
(2.76) (3.37) (5.87) (1.05) (6.52)
9 8 70-82 104 ODAm' - 0.0042 -0.011** 0.0011* -*-- - - -1.66" 4.71 0.22 0.87 1.89* 73"
(1.49) (7.23) (7.36) (4.61)
10 8 68-82 120 ODA 0.00004 - - - - - - 0.0003" 0.003 -0.003 - -0.003" 2.10~ 0.46 0.83 2.11" 56"
RE (1.25) (6.27) (0.13) (0.91) (6.27)
11 5 68-82 75 ODAm - 0.009' -0.007" 0.001" - - - - - - - -0.65" 3.47 0.22 0.85 1.69" 64"
(2.40) (2.83) (10.43) (6.15)
12 5 68-82 45 ODAm - 0.003 0.009" 0.004" - - -- - - - - -0.05" 0.03 0.02 0.92 1.96" 111"
(0.97) (3.15) (15.46) (3.67)
13 8 68-75 64 ODAm - 0.0007 -0.002 0.0014" -- - - -- - -- -0.96" 0.06 0.03 0.96 1.95' 202*
(0.31) (1.68) (24.65) (0.90)
14 8 75-82 64 ODAm - 0.008* -0.008' 0.0008** - -- - - - - - -0.36' 2.11 0.19 0.89 .18" 55"
(2.66) (2.56) (9.20) (1.67)
l,
NOTES: The figures in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-values.
R
2 
is the corrected coefficient of determination.
SSE is the error sum of squares.
Sy is the standard error of the estimate.
F indicates the F-value.
0-W is the Durbin-Watson statistic value.
OLS indicates ordinary least squares.
Asterisks mean that the variable is expressed in real terms.
Significant at the I1 level.
- significant at the 5% level.
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where uit is a spherical disturbance independent of the disturbance
E(u 'N(0, 6 2itu
To estimate these equations we use a Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure
as described in Section 2 of the Appendix. The serial correlation is
thereby removed, the Durbin-Watson test being significant at a 1%
level. 13  When re-estimated, the standard errors of the estimates are
reduced (see Table 2).
All the equations in Table 2 are specified with country dummy
variables. Nevertheless, due to space limitations, the results for the
dummy variables are not reported. However, for illustrative purposes we
report the estimated parameters of the dummy variables in the following
table, for the Equations 7 and 9.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE DUMMY VARIABLES
Equation 7 Equation 9
Estimated Estimated
Estimated t-ratios Standard Estimated t-ratios Standard
Countries Parameters (109d.f) Errors Parameters (109d.f) Errors
Germany 0.73 9.78 0.07 1.62 5.81 0.27
United Kingdom 0.76 9.27 0.08 1.73 5.77 0.30
France 0.64 8.24 0.07 1.58 5.28 0.29
Netherlands 0.76 8.30 0.09 1.78 5.11 0.34
Sweden 0.77 8.27 0.09 1.79 5.07 0.35
Norway 0.72 7.71 0.09 1.75 4.88 0.35
Denmark 0.73 7.81 0.09 1.75 4.90 0.35
13According to the table from N.E. Savin and K.J. White, "The
Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation with extreme sample size or many
regressors", Econometrics, Vol. 45, No. 8, Nov. 1977, pp. 1989-1996.
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From these data, we can test whether the estimated parameters of the
country dummy variables are different. For example, we tested the equality
of the estimated coefficients for France and Sweden, using the following
test:
H0  OF =
H1 : SF #
S'F ~S
F s t
SF~ V S n-k
where SS is the estimated standard error and
F ~ aS = 2F.+ S -2 Est. cov(SF, SS
The estimated cov( 9F' s) is taken from the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimated parameters. Since the absolute value of t is
statistically significant at a 1% level (the t-statistic values are 2.48 and
5.61 respectively in Cases 7 and 9), the hypothesis that the two
coefficients are equal must be rejected. This means that some
considerations not taken into account by the explanatory variables affect
differently the amount of multilateral aid channeled by these countries.
3.1. The Multilateral Aid Allocation Pattern
When multilateral ODA is expressed in nominal magnitudes (Equation 7)
the balance of payments surplus and the GNP have a statistically significant
influence (at a 1% level) with the expected sign. The budget surplus,
although it is statistically significant, has an unexpected negative sign.
Equation 8 represents an attempt to take into account the unemployment
rate. Since this variable is in relative terms, we scaled it by GNP as M.
Beenstock did. 14 The estimated coefficient has the expected sign but is
not statistically significant (although GNP and U.GNP are correlated, this
does not significantly al ter the regression analysis since the estimated
14Beenstock, loc. cit., p. 140.
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coefficients do not change much when U.GNP is included). We do not use this
variable in the following equations since it appears difficult to interpret
its regression coefficient.
In Equation 9, the variables are expressed in real terms, and only the
GNP is statistically significant. The balance of payments variable,
although it is not significant, has nevertheless the expected sign.
When multilateral ODA is expressed relatively to GNP (Equation 10) only
the GNP per capita is statistically significant: the higher the country's
GNP per capita is, the greater the ODAm/GNP ratio is.
These results suggest that GNP (when multilateral ODA is expressed in
absolute terms) and GNP per capita (when multilateral ODA is expressed as a
proportion of GNP) are the main economic determinants of the multilateral
aid allocation. The balance of payment constraint appears, also, to have an
impact on the amount of multilateral ODA but only when this variable is
expressed in nominal terms. The other explanatory variables - unemployment
rate and budget surplus - fail to confirm the hypotheses developed in
Section 2.
3.1.1. Comparison of the multilateral aid allocation process in the
Scandinavian countries and in the other donor countries
Scandinavian countries have a stronger interest in closer international
cooperation than the other countries because they are small states. Indeed,
multilateral channels reduce their administrative costs of sharing aid so
that multilateral aid programs are relatively more important in these
countries than in larger states.15 According to this, it seems
interesting to determine whether economic factors have a different influence
on multilateral aid allocation in these two samples of countries. For this
purpose, we estimate two allocation functions on a sample of three
Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark) and five other donors (the
United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands).
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 2 (Equations 11
and 12).
15For a comparison of the foreign aid poli cies of small states and
large states, see J.S. Hoadley, "Small States as Aid Donors", International
Organization, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1980, pp. 121-137.
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A comparison of these equations seems to prove that economic factors
influence Scandinavian countries differently from the other countries:
First, the results show that a budget deficit influences negatively the
Scandinavian countries' aid allocation contrary to the other states.
Furthermore, the balance of payments constraint is not statistically
significant for the sample of Scandinavian countries whereas it
significantly affects, in the predicted positive direction, the multilateral
aid allocation from the other countries. To determine whether these
differences are statistically significant, we use a Chow-test (see Section 3
of the Appendix), testing the hypotheses:
H0 : The economic factors have the same influence on multilateral
aid allocation in the Scandinavian countries as they do in
the other countries.
HA: The economic factors have a different influence.
The F-value is equal to 3.47 and is significant at a 5% level. This
result confirms that economic constraints affect differently the
multilateral aid allocation in Scandinavian countries than in the other
countries.
3.1.2. Comparison of the multilateral aid allocation process before and
after the 1973-74 crisis
Was the influence of economic factors on multilateral aid allocation
changed after the 1973-74 crisis? To answer this, we estimate separately
two functions for the periods 1968-75 and 1975-82 (Equations 13 and 14,
Table 2) and test the hypotheses:
H0 : The economic factors have the same effect in these two
periods.
HA: The economic factors have a different effect.
The F-value, calculated as previously, is equal to 30.9 which is
significant at a 1% level. Hence we can reject H0 and conclude that the
influence of economic factors on the donor's multilateral aid allocation did
change after the 1973-74 crisis. The nature of this difference is reflected
by the fact that the balance of payments position is not a significant
13
variable for the period 1968-1975 whereas it is significant at a 5% level
for the years 1975 to 1982. The economic crisis appears, therefore, to have
increased the influence of the balance of payments constraints on the
multilateral aid allocation process.
3.2. Comparison of the Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Allocation Processes
Bilateral and multilateral aid are, by nature, very different. 16
Multilateral aid seems to provide less direct benefits to the donor's
foreign policy than does bilateral aid. Indeed, through the bilateral
channel, donor governments deal directly with the recipient countries so
that economic aid can be used to put pressure on the recipients' foreign
policy. One would also believe that bilateral aid is less affected by a
balance of payments constraint than multilateral aid in that bilateral aid
remains largely tied to purchases in donor countries. For these reasons we
can expect a different pattern in bilateral and multilateral aid allocation
processes.
To verify this assertion, we estimated bilateral aid allocation
functions. The results, presented in Table 4, are quite different from the
results of the multilateral aid functions.
When the amount of aid is expressed in nominal terms (Equation 15) the
model gives a good explanation of the bilateral aid allocation process.
Ninety-six percent of the variance of ODAB can be attributed to the
variation of the explanatory variables. All the parameters have the
expected sign and both the budget surplus and the GNP are statistically
significant at a 1% level.
When bilateral ODA is expressed in real terms (Equation 16) only the GNP
and the budget surplus have a statistically significant influence with the
expected sign. This estimation explains 94% of the variance of bilateral
aid.
16For a comparative analysis of bilateral and multilateral aid, see T.
Balogh, "Multilateralism versus Bilateralism in Foreign Aid", in 3.
Bhagwati, R. Eckaus, Foreign Aid, Selected Readings (New York: Penguin
Books, 1970), pp. 201-222; and D. Wall, The Charity of Nations: The
Political Economy of Foreign Aid, the Political Economy of International
Relations Series (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 126-149.
TABLE 4
BILATERAL AID PROCESS: RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSISa
Number of Dependent IL B.G
Equation Period Observations Variable U BAL BUDG GNP GNP*/P GNP GNP BAL* BUDG' GNP' Constant SSE Sy R
2  
D-H F
15 68.82 120 ODAg - 0.005 0.0049* 0.0017" -- - - - - - 2.68' 5.08 0.21 0.96 1.93" 330"
(1.11) (1.96) (6.27) (1.58)
16 70.82 104 ODA8  - - - - - - - -0.003 0.001' 0.00012" 5.11" 12.4 0.36 0.94 1.98 182"
(0.54) (2.30) (4.34) (5.75)
17 68.82 120 ODAg 0.00002 - - - 0.0003" 0.00001 0.000005 -- - - -0.003 5.10-5 0.71 0.83 2.09' 56"
(0.38) 1(2.42) (0.70) (0.56) (0.95)
NOTES: aThese equations use pooled data in a first autoregressive scheme with dummy variables.
The figures in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-values.
R
2 
is the corrected coefficient of determination.
SSE is the error sum of squares.
Sy is the standard error of the estimate.
F indicates the F-value.
D-N is the Durbin-Hatson statistic value.
OLS indicates ordinary least squares.
Asterisks mean that the variable is expressed in real terms.
"- Significant at the 1L level.
-significant at the 5% level.
-J
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When bilateral ODA is expressed as a proportion of the GNP (Equation
17), only the GNP per capita comes out statistically significant. The
budget and balance of payments variables have the expected sign. The
unemployment rate is not significant and has an unexpected positive sign, as
in the case of the multilateral aid allocation process.
We compared these regression results with those concerning the
multilateral aid process by means of the Chow-test. The following
hypotheses were tested:
H0 : The economic factors have the same effect on multilateral aid
as they do on bilateral aid.
HA: The economic factors have a different effect.
To apply this test, we pooled the bilateral and multilateral data in
order to get the restricted residual sum of squares (Table 5). The
F-statistic values are 35.4, 18.8, and 9.4 when ODA is expressed,
respectively, in nominal terms, real terms and as a percentage of the GNP.
These F-values are statistically significant at a 1% level and confirm that
economic factors influence differently the bilateral and multilateral aid
allocations.
It seems interesting to observe in addition that, when ODA is expressed
in absolute terms (Equations 18 and 19), the pooling of multilateral and
bilateral aid data gives a good explanation of the total aid allocation
process. In both equations, the explanatory variables have a statistically
significant influence in the predicted positive direction. These
estimations explain respectively 88% and 87% of the variance on the
independent variables.
4. CONCLUSION
Since the late 1970's there has been a decline in the rate of increase
of financial contributions channelled through multilateral agencies by DAC
member countries. In this context, it seemed worthwhile to examine
aid-givers' behavior. For this purpose, we have analysed the influence of
economi c factors on the mul tilateral ai d proces s i n a group of major DAC
TABLE 5
POOLINGa OF MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL AID: RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Numoer of Number of Dependent BAL .B_@G
Equation Countries Period Observations Variable U BAL BUDG GNP GNP/P GNP GNP BAL* BUDG* GNP Constant SSE Sy-H F
18 8 68-86 240 in nominal - 0.014* 0.082** 0.001* -- - - -- - -- 0.39' 23.21 0.31 0.88 2.36 190**
terms (2.96) (3.05) (10.78) (0.87)
19 8 70-82 208 in real - -- -- -- - -- - 0.010* 0.0048* 0.0010* 0.0018 0.004 0.004 0.87 2.33 132**
terms (2.02) (1.96) (2.46) (1.54)
20 8 68-82 240 as propor- 0.00004 -- - -- 0.00026** 0.00051 -0.0018 - - -- -0.002* 0.0001 0.0007 0.83 2.31 101*
tion of (0.87) (3.37) *0.18) (0.47) (1.74)
GNP
NOTES: aAccording to a first autoregressive scheme with dummy variables.
The figures in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-values.
R
2 
is the corrected coefficient of determination.
SSE is the error sum of squares.
Sy is the standard error of the estimate.
F indicates the F-value.
0-N is the Durbin-Watson statistic value.
OLS indicates ordinary least squares.
Asterisks mean that the variable is expressed in real terms.
*- Significant at the 1% level.
*- significant at the S% level.
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member countries, using multiple-regression techniques. We expressed
multilateral ODA in nominal terms, real terms and as a proportion of GNP.
In this last case, the results are quite disappointing since only GNP per
capita significantly influences this variable. ON the contrary, when
multilateral ODA is expressed in nominal or real magnitudes, the results are
more interesting.
First, they indicate that, in addition to GNP, the balance of payments
constraint significantly influences the DAC members' multilateral aid
allocation: the stronger the balance of payments position is, the lower the
constraint on aid allocation is. This is particularly evident after the
1973-74 crisis and for all the countries considered except the Scandinavian
ones. Indeed, for these countries, the budget constraint seems to explain
in a better way the multilateral aid allocation pattern. The increasing
budget deficit in these states since the late 1970's might explain the
relative slowing down of the volume of aid they channel through multilateral
agencies.
The comparison of bilateral and multilateral aid allocation further
indicates how these are differently influenced by economic factors. In
particular, the balance of payments constraint has no significant influence
on the bilateral aid allocation, contrary to the multilateral
contributions. This result might be explained by the fact that bilateral
aid is more directly tied to purchases in donor countries than is
multilateral aid, so that the balance of payments constraint has a different
and insignificant impact on the bilateral aid allocation. The budget
position also appears to influence differently the bilateral and
multilateral aid allocation. Though this variable has an unexpected
influence on the distribution of multilateral aid (i.e., the more important
the budget deficit is, the greater the amount of aid is), it has the
expected impact on the volume of bilateral aid: the greater the budget
deficit is in the year t-l, the less important the volume of bilateral aid
is in the year t. These results suggest that governments cut down on the
volume of bilateral aid rather than on the volume of multilateral aid to
decrease budget deficits.
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In conclusion, the limits and the possible extension of such an analysis
should be emphasized. First, it seems necessary to remember the highly
speculative nature of this analysis, since aid allocation is ultimately a
political decision. Second, since we take into account only economic
considerations, there is no assurance that the models tested are not
misspecified, so that the correlations we found may be due to excluded
variables, and may be quite unrelated to causality.
Finally, it appears possible to improve upon the specification of the
different alternative models by using, for example, different time-lag
periods or more appropriate variables. (For example, the rate of
unemployment may not be an appropriate proxy variable to measure the
domestic climate towards aid in donor countries.)
APPENDIX
1. To test whether or not the intercepts are different we used the
following F-test:
SSER - SSE /r F
F = St r,df
SSEU/df
testing the hypothesis H0 : a ( ........ "aN
HA: the ai are not all equal
where r = number of restrictions - N - 1
df = degrees of freedom - (T x N) - K in the unrestricted model
K = number of parameters to estimate
SSEU = unrestricted residual sum of squares
SSER = restricted residual sum of squares
The results are as follow:
Cases 1-2: F = 7.58
Cases 3-4: F - 4.38
Cases 5-6: F - 19.46
The F-values are, in every case, statistically significant at a 1% level.
Source: Maddala, G.S., Econometrics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977),
pp. 323-324.
2. The Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure consists of the following steps:
a. We estimate the following equation by OLS:
Yt = a+8SXt + E (1)
We get the residual et and estimate P by:
P 2(t -2, ..... , T)
eti
b. Then, by lagging (1) by one time period and multiplying by P, we
get:
Yt- - a n+ nXt-1 + P Et-1 (2)
Subtracting (2) from (1) we get:
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Yt - p t-1 = a (I - p)+ (Xt - p Xt-1) + ut
where ut = Et - p Etl
We obtain OLS estimates which may be called a and 3, and lead to
residuals "t. These residuals are used to obtain a new estimate
of p:
E tet-1P= (t = 2, ... n)
et-1
c. He can retransform the variables, recompute the estimates and get a
new estimate of until successive values of P are approximately
the same. In this case the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation involves
a loss of 8 observations. However, the Shazam econometrics
computer program used to run this transformation avoided dropping
the first observations by using the following Prais-Winsten
transformation:
Yt = JI-p1 t for t = 1.
3. The Chow-test can be expressed as follows:
(SSER - SSEU)/k F
SSEU/n +n 2 -2K) K,n +n 2 -2K
To obtain the unrestricted residual sum of squares, we estimate each
equation separately (Equations 11 and 12), get the . residual sum of
squares for each equation, and add them. To obtain the restricted
residual sum of squares, we pool the data and estimate a single equation
(Equation 7). K is the number of restrictions. ni and n2 are
respectively the number of observations in Equations 11 and 12.
Source: Maddala, p. 198.
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TABLE A
VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
Symbol Variables Source
ODAm Multilateral Aid Disbursements DAC Annual Reports
ODAb Bilateral Aid Disbursements DAC Annual Reports
U Unemployment Rate as % of OECD, Economic Outlook
active population
GNP Gross national Product DAC Annual Reports
GNP*/P GNP at 1980 Market Prices IMF, Supplement On Output
divided by Midyear Population Statistics, 1984
BAL Current Account Balance IMF, International Financial
Statistics
BUDG Net Budget Surplusa IMF, International Financial
Statistics
NOTE: aConverted into US dollars using
taken from IFS.
an average of exchange rates
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